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IMPROVING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING
IN a world in which the center of political gravity is shifting from legisla-
ture to executive the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 1 represents an
attempt by Congress to reassess and strengthen its position as an integral
part of representative government.2 Congress has recognized the need for
reorganizing and streamlining the decision making process if it is to recapture
its position as the dominant policy determining branch of government.
Reformation of the standing committees, 3 increased use of governmental
experts, 4 higher salaries for members,5 prohibition of private legislation, 0
1. Pub. L. 601, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946) (hereafter cited by section only).
The Act is the product of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, of which
Senator LaFollette (Wis.) was chairman and Representative Monroney (0kla.) vice-
chairman.
2. "Our committee was created in response to a widespread congressional and public
belief that a grave constitutional crisis exists in which the fate of representative government
itself is at stake. Public affairs are now handled by a host of administrative agencies headed
by nonelected officials with only casual oversight by Congress. The course of events has
created a breach between government and the people. Behind our inherited constitutional
pattern a new political order has arisen which constitutes a basic change in the federal de-
sign. Meanwhile, government by administration is the object of group pressures which
weaken its protection of the public interest. Under these conditions . . . the time is ripe
for Congress to reconsider its role in the American scheme of government and to modernize
its organization and procedures." SEN. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946) 1. The
Joint Committee made recommendations for congressional reorganization in this report. A
subsequent report was submitted discussing the Act as drafted by the committee with the
assistance of the Office of Legislative Counsel. See SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1946). Both reports will hereafter be cited by number only.
3. Sections 102, 121. The 33 standing committees of the Senate and the 48 standing
committees of the House are reduced to 15 and 19 respectively, thus eliminating many repet-
itive and overlapping functions previously performed. Regularization of committee proce-
dure in respect to hearings, meetings, and record-keeping as well as definition of committee
powers are all provisions designed to make more efficient utilization of both time and per-
sonnel. An unavoidable weakness of these sections is that they have only the force of Rules
of the respective houses, and either may revoke provisions applicable to it. Opposition of
legislators with vested interests in former committees may result in the mushrooming of new
standing committees over a period of time. Although there is no indication that the number
of standing committees will be increased by the 80th Congress, a growth in the number of
special committees might also vitiate these provisions.
4. Sections 202, 203, 204. Appropriations to the Legislative Reference Bureau and
the Office of Legislative Counsel are to be increased from $198,000 to $750,000 and $90,000
to $250,000 respectively in the hope that these services will be improved both in the quality
of their work and in the number of legislators served. Other provisions provide for the em-
ployment of four experts to advise each standing committee and improved clerical aid. The
original bill went even further in providing for an administrative assistant for each congress-
man and the establishment of an Office of Congressional Personnel designed to end the so-
called patronage system. S. 2177, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1946) §§ 201, 204. Opposition to
the loss of such a political bonanza prevented their becoming a part of the Act. See 92 Cong.
Rec., June 8, 1946, at 6654-6.
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regulation of lobbying activities 7 are all methods of improving the intelli-
gence function of government so as to increase the probability of rational
legislative decision.
The provisions of the Act which regulate lobbying are, therefore, to be
regarded as one element in a larger scheme to improve present political proc-
esses. Democratic political theory assumes that rational decision can best
be reached after hearing and evaluating the interests of the component mem-
bers of society. These interests are in theory expressed by individuals
through the medium of their elected representatives in the legislature.
Election of these representatives on a geographical basis overlooks the fact
that individuals identify their interests not only with a state or political
subdivision, but more importantly with a business, economic, social, or
fraternal group. Technological advances in communication and transporta-
tion have facilitated group interests which are no longer confined within
political boundaries. The failure of the Constitution to provide for group
representation, the decline of the political party as a prompter of opinion
and policy, the intrusion of government into virtually all fields of economic
activity, and the increasing complexity of modem legislative problems have
led to the development of a powerful extra-legal machinery for achieving
group aims. Today legislation is the result of a compromise between these
conflicting group interests, but survival of geographical representation
largely obscures the functional basis for legislative action.
Two groups have advanced remedies designed to reconcile the existing
fact situation with political theory. The first seeks a means by which group
interests can be fitted into the formal pattern of government, a system of
functional representation as a substitute for, or supplement to, existing po-
litical institutions.8 On the other hand, a second group regards the problem
5. Section 601. The original bill proposed a flat $15,000 salary but this .,;as amended
in the House to include only a $2,500 increase and continuance of the previous $2,500 tax-
exempt expense allowance.
6. Section 131. The provisions of Title IV (Federal Tort Claims Act) which transfer
adjudication of tort claims from Congress to the federal courts or, in minor instances, to the
administrative agency involved and Title V (General Bridge Act), which eliminate the neces-
sity of Congressional approval for the construction of bridges over navigable streams, are
complementary to the ban on private legislation.
7. Section 301 el seg. Section 301 provides that Title III of the Act may be cited as
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. See Comment (1947) 47 COL. L. Rzv. 98.
8. Proposals for functional representation have never been as well received in the
United States as in Europe. Political scientists have suggested constitutional revisions de-
signed to eliminate the geographical system. See, for example, 1%IAcDo.,%, A NEw Co.-
STITUTION FOR A Nnw AmERrcA (1921). But practical efforts have been limited to propoals
for advisory councils to represent economic interests as a supplement to geographical repre-
sentation.In 1931 Senator LaFollette introduced a bill embodying this concept in Congress.
See S. 6215, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess. (1931). Such a body to advise the executive was suggested
by President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, REcENT SoCIAL TnM;Ds U
T UNITED STATES (1933). Pressure groups, notably the National Lumber Manufacturers
Association and the United Steelworkers (CIO), have expressed approval of the idea.
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of representation as subordinate to a rationalization of the whole legislative
process. Their emphasis is upon administrative efficiency, extension of
federal research and information services, increased governmental planning,
and bringing "lobbying" activities into the open. It is this view which
Congress has espoused in the Reorganization Act.9
THE PROBLEM
If lobbying is defined in its broadest terms as any attempt by individuals
or groups to influence governmental decision, it is apparent that in some form
it inheres in all government. 10 American history is full of examples of legisla-
tion passed at the instance of, and for the benefit of, special interests." But
lobbying today is both qualitatively and quantitatively a different problem
from lobbying in the past. Whereas the old-style lobby, confined almost en-
tirely to representatives of business interests, operated secretly and depended
for its success upon personal solicitation of legislators, often accompanied by
corruption, such methods are largely obsolete today.'2 Modern lobbyists, or
Statement of Robert K. Lamb, Hearings before the Joint Conmittee on the Organization of
Congress pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 1013.
Parliaments of industry or advisory councils have been widely adopted in Europe.
Results in these countries have not, however, indicated that a formal joining of politics and
economics is an effective solution to the problem of pressure groups. Herring, Legalized
Lobbying in Europe (1930) 31 CURRENT HISTORY 947. For more general discussions of
groupism see COLE, GUILD SOCIALISM RESTATED (1920); DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN
STATE (1919); LASKI, GRAMMAR OF POLITICS (1925); WALLAS, THE GREAT SOCIETY (1914).
9. A full discussion of the congressional reorganization is found in GALLOWAY, CON-
GRESS AT THE CROSSROADS (1946). Dr. Galloway was advisor to the joint committee which
drafted the bill. See also, Report of the Committee on Congress of the American Political
Science Association, THE REORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS (1945); Simmons, Reorganization
of the Federal Government (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 63.
10. In general see BLAISDELL, TNEC REP., ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITICAL PRES-
SURE, Monograph No. 26 (1941); CHASE, DEMOcRAcY UNDER PRESSuRE (1945); CRAWFORD,
THE PRESSURE Boys (1939); HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS (1929);
Lobby, 9 ENcyc. Soc. SCIENCES 565 (1933); Boeckel, Regulation of Congressional Lobbies
(1928) 1 ED. RES. REP. 207; Brewer, Congressional Lobbying (1946) 1 id. 317; Logan, Lobby.
ing (1929) 144 THE ANNALS (July Supp.); Pressure Groups and Propaganda (1935) 179 id,,
passim. More specialized studies which throw light on the pressure group problem are
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935) and ZELLER, PRESSURE.
POLITICS IN NEWYORK (1937).
11. See MERRIAM, AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1923) 113 el seg.; Odegard, Lobbies and
American Legislation (1930) 31 CURRENT HISTORY 690, 692. A recent study of 90 major laws
disclosed that pressure groups were important in securing passage in every case, and that
seven of these laws were in effect enacted by pressure groups, both the President and Con-
gress subordinating their views to those of powerful lobbies. Chamberlain, The President,
Congress, and Legislation (1946) 61 POL. SCL Q. 42, 49.
12. Discussions of the old-style lobby are found in HERRING, op. cit. supra note 10, at
30-40; Boeckel, supra note 10 at 211-14; 2 PoORE, PERLEY'S REMINISCENCES (1886) 515
et seg. Occasionally the corruption resulted in a national scandal such as that which accom-
panied the operations of Cornelius Wendell, creator of the infamous "whiskey ring" during
the administration of President Grant. The investigation of the Credit Mobilier in 1872
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legislative agents, act on behalf of almost every conceivable business, eco-
nomic, and social group,' 3 generally operate openly and frankly,1 4 and rely
upon public opinion, real or stimulated through judicious use of'publicity and
propaganda, to compel legislative action.
Fundamental reasons for the transition from old to new lobby are to be
found in the same considerations which have given rise to demands for func-
tional representation. 6 As the technological barriers to group organization
on a national scale have been removed, the common interests of workers,
farmers, professional men and social reformers have led each to strive to
participate in governmental decisions. Increased public scrutiny of the
legislative process, a consequence of the growth of radio and press services,
has made legislators more conscious of the force of public opinion. Pressure
groups with large memberships are an effective threat to an elective office
holder through the votes they control and the large segment of public opinion
they represent; those with a smaller popular base can secure legislative con-
sideration of their proposals only by stimulating or feigning public approba-
tion.
Legislative investigations aimed at disclosing the extent of lobbying prac-
tices bear striking testimony to the effectiveness 10 of utilization of mass
likewise revealed distribution of stock, free passes, telegraph and exprEs franks to members
of Congress. The old lobby center was Pendleton's Game Rooms, the "Hall of the Bleeding
Heart," on Pennsylvania Avenue, vhere bribes were passed to impecunious legislators in
the form of card winnings. Corrupt practices are still occasionally resorted to today. See
the revelations of the activities of Robert Smith by the Black Investigating Committee,
discussed in 27 Tram (Mar. 30, 1936) 15-16, and the more recent disclosures of the Mead
Committee Investigation of War Contracts, N. Y. Times, July 18, 1946, p. 1, col. 6. The
greatest temptation to resort to bribery seems to be found in the awarding of contracts by
governmental agencies.
13. Estimates as to the number of lobbyists in Washington vary widely. One vriter
puts the number at 6,000. CRAwroRD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 3. A more conscrvative
figure is 400, a number of which are ineffective. See HERRM G, op. Cit. supra note 10, at
276-83; BLAISDELL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 197. The list compiled by Herring in 1929 was
used as the basis for TNEC compilation in 1940 and found substantially accurate. But x'ari-
ous Washington correspondents estimate the number to have doubled during the war. S-e
Brewer, supra note 10, at 322, n. 10; Mlechling, Washinglon Lobbies Tlrcaten Demrocracy
(1946) 22 VA. Q. REv. 321. a
14. Since the power of modern pressure groups depends on the number of votes they
control and their influence on public opinion there is little to gain from concealing their iden-
tity. For this reason many lobbyists, who represent groups with a large popular base, favor
registration laws which will eliminate the "fake" lobbyist who represent non-existent
groups. Furthermore, official recognition of their activities may serve to enhance their pre-
tige. See Logan, supra note 10, at 73.
15. Other reasons advanced are (1) Reform of the House Rules in 1911; (2) Adoption
of the practice of open committee hearings; (3) Direct election of Senators persuant to the
17th amendment; (4) The lobby investigations of 1913. HERRUNG, op. Cit. supra note 10, at
41-6. Much of the old-time corruption may have been traceable to the system of dozed
committee hearings. See WILsoN, CONGRnSsioAL GOVERNmeNT (1885) 1S-90.
16. See BEALE, ARn AIE~icAx TEAcanRs FaEE? (1936); RAup, EDucATio. AND
ORGANIZED INTEREsTs ix A=MRicA (1936); BarzE, NoT To BE BRoAucAsT (1937); Deni-
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channels of propaganda provided by the newspaper, the radio, the school,
the theater, and the church. Pressure can be brought on legislators by pub-
licity campaigns designed to prompt constituents, within or without the
pressure group, to bring influence to bear by writing letters or sending tele-
grams;17 at election dates, candidates, regardless of party affiliation, 8 con-
sidered favorably disposed toward group interests can be supported by the
organization; or public opinion can be skillfully moulded to identify the
public interest with legislation favored by the group.
To supplement these indirect methods of influencing legislation most pres-
sure groups maintain a Washington expert, and a technical information serv-
ice. The expert, or lobbyist, makes the group's views known to legislators
either through direct contact, testimony before committees 19 or the submis-
sion of written statements, often carefully documented by highly paid legal
counsel. He undertakes to provide extensive factual surveys to support his
position, analyze legislation, draft bills, or perform any other service the
congressman may desire. In addition he keeps the organization posted on
the status of bills in committee or on the floor which may affect the group.
Even if no practical or constitutional 20 difficulties were encountered, few
son, Editorial Policies of Broadcasting Companies (1937) 1 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTIERLY 64.
A complete bibliography on propaganda techniques can be found in SMITH, LASSWELL and
CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COiMUNICATION, AND PUBLIC OPINION (1946); LAsswELtL, CASEY and
SMITH, PROPAGANDA AND PROMOTIONAL AcTIvITIEs (1935).
17. There is some disagreement as to the effectiveness of these practices. Where the
inspiration is obviously from a pressure group, as in the case of form letters or telegrams, the
legislator is not likely to be influenced. But the contrary is true where the communication
appears to be the genuine expression of opinion by a constituent. Needless to say it is often
hard to detect the existence of the pressure group in the background. As to the effectiveness
of such pressure devices see Zeller, Modern Pressure Groups (1939) 29 Am. LAB. LEG, REV.
152, 155; Odegard, supra note 11 at 694; But see Statement of Senator McClellan, 92 Cong.
Rec., June 10, 1946, at 6677; Bellows, In Defense of Lobbying (1935) 172 HARPERS 96. One
method of instigating genuine letters was practiced by the sugar interests who procured their
employees to write letters to Congress. See Thomas, My Adventures With the Sugar Lobby
(1913) 26 WORLD'S WORK 540. Policy holders of insurance companies have been solicited to
send wires and letters to legislators at the expense of the company. BLAISDELL, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 136.
18.1 The two-party system has discouraged direct participation in politics by pressure
groups, who prefer to support individual candidates from whom promises can be extracted.
Consciousness on the part of political parties as to the political power of special interests has
led to the addition of more and more planks in party platforms designed to attract a group
vote. See Logan, supra note 10, at 80; Odegard, Political Parties and Group Pressures (1935)
179 THE ANNALS 68.
19. An examination of the testimony before almost any Congressional Committee indi-
cates the extent of this activity. Modern legislation affects many groups in widely scattered
areas and occupations. See, for example, the lobbying of coal, gas, labor (UMW), railroads,
steel, and electric interests in regard to the proposed sale of the "Little-Big-Inch" pipeline,
discussed in Hullingeir, The Lobby's Part in Democracy (March 1946) 34 NATION'S BUsINss
78, 79-80.
20. The Constitutional difficulty is the applicability of the First Amendment which
prohibits "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of people . . . to
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observers today would advocate the abolition of pressure groups or forbid
the activities of lobbyists.2 In addition to providing an unofficial form of
functional representation, pressure group activities which publicize the
legislative process, focus attention upon the voting records of congressmen,
and keep the public informed as to the content and significance of legislative
proposals are desirable in a democracy. The expert analysis of bills made by
the competent lobbyist before congressional committees, and the link he
provides between legislators and a large segment of the public may well im-
prove the quality of legislative decision. While the larger and more cohesive
the interest represented the more justification can be found for its activities,
it remains true that the smallest minority has a right to be heard. It is hope-
less to classify lobbies in terms of "good" or "bad", i.e., those which concern
themselves with what they conceive to be the public welfare and those which
work for the direct interests, usually economic, of their membership. All
lobbies identify their interests with those of the general public and may, in
particular situations, be justified in doing so. The danger to rational legisla-
tive decision lies not from hearing the claims of organized groups, but from
inability to determine when those claims legitimately represent the welfare
of the general public. This difficulty stems from the ignorance of legislators
petition the government for a redress of grievances." Although these rights are fundamental
they are not absolute in nature and can be limited when the facts make it imperative. See
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665-7 (1884) (government can protect itself against
"the influence of extraneous violence and internal corruption"); Burroughs and Cannon v.
United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934) (upholding analogous Corrupt Practices Act as being
within congressional power). In the fifty-six years since Massachusetts enacted its lobbying
law, the constitutionality of state statutes embodying similar requirements has been attacked
only once. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 264, 17 S. W. (2d) 227 (1929) (Kentucky
statute upheld on grounds of danger to government from improper lobbying and corrup-
tion).
It is not likely that the instant Act will be challenged as a violation of the right of free
speech or right to petition. Although many groups have registered under protest that the
Act did not apply to their activities, only one has filed notice that it considers the Act a vio-
lation of the Constitution. See Memorandum on Regulation of Lobbying Act from Thomas
James Norton to Dr. Edward A. Rumely, Assistant Secretary of the Committee for Consti-
tutional Government, September 14, 1946. In addition to abridging the right to petition,
Mr. Norton contends that the filing of financial statements under the Act constitutes an
illegal search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the Commit-
tee has registered under the Act is perhaps indicative that not even it regards the argument
as persuasive.
21. This represents the almost universal view of modern commentators. But the cor-
ruption which marked the old lobby caused earlier writers to take a contrary view. See
Notes (1919) 23 LAw NOTEs 3; (1922) 25 i d. 223; (1923) 26 id. 222. Revelations of modem
practices have occasionally evoked similar remarks from legislators and the prLss. See, for
example, the speech of Senator Black on Aug. 8, 1935. "Contrary to tradition, against the
public morals, and hostile to good government, the lobby has reached such a position of
power that it threatens government itself. Its size, its power, its capacity for evil; its greed,
trickery, deception and fraud condemn it to the death it deserves. You, the people of the
United States, will not permit it to destroy you. You will destroy it." Black, Lobby Inr .sti-
gation (1935) 1 VITAL SPEECHES 762, 765.
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amidst the growing complexity of 'governmental functions, the unequal
power of pressure groups, and the abuses which have survived the old lobby
or arisen in the new lobby.
The evils disclosed by legislative investigations of lobbying fall roughly
into two categories: (1) activities which leave the public and legislators with
inadequate or unbalanced information on which to make decisions; and (2)
activities which coerce or corrupt legislators.
Pressure group propaganda aimed primarily at influencing the public is
often characterized by misrepresentation or distortion of fact, made more
effective by concealment of source. When the source of a statement is undis-
closed, or appears nonpartisan, legislators and the public, ignorant of motiva-
tion, cannot evaluate possible bias. Special interests have often created a
favorable climate of opinion by such questionable practices as controlling
newspaper editorial policy by placement or withdrawal of advertising;12
sending "canned copy" to country presses ;3 hiring radio commentators and
columnists to express favorable views, educators to write textbooks, and
speakers to address clubs, schools, and churches without revelation of the
contract of employment.
While most lobbyists openly admit their affiliations, many are prone to
exaggerate the size and cohesion of their membership, and sometimes work
for interests other than those they claim to represent. Oftentimes one group
will serve as a "front" for another, disguising the partisan nature of the views
it advocates ;214 some lobbies of this type exist on paper only. 25 The forces of
22. See Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Actiities pursuani
to S. .Res. 165 and S. Res. 184, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), pt. 3, passim. The testimony of
Mr. Hopson of the Associated Gas and Electric Co. is particularly enlightening. Whether or
not withdrawal of advertising is actually threatened is of minor importance. The very mag-
nitude of the advertising expenditures is sufficient to create a friendly atmosphere in news-
paper circles.
23. Such copy is often sent out in the form of "boiler plate" to small town and country
newspapers. Since it is already set up in type, it can be used as an inexpensive filler. When
printed it is clipped by the pressure group and sent to legislators as an indication of local
editorial opinion. The American Bankers Association sends out such matter to over 6,000
newspapers with an estimated reading public of 25,000,000. BLAISDELL, op. Cit. supra note
10, at 130. One utilities company secured the equivalent of 65,526 pages of newspaper space
in this manner. Odegard, Lobbies and American Legislation (1930) 31 CURRENT HISTORY
690, 696.
24. "If the Chamber of Commerce is the spokesman at Washington for American busl-
ness, its special pleader before Government and people is the American Bar Association."
BLAISDELL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 37. Some associations claim a wide popular base but
investigation shows their financial support is not coterminous with their membership. Tax-
payers Associations often derive their funds from large corporate interests.
25. "These associations include fake agricultural associations, fake scientific associa-
tions, fake religious associations, fake temperance associations, fake associations in opposi-
tion to prohibition, and, in fact, nearly every activity of the human mind has been capitalized
by some grafter with 'headquarters' established for this activity in Washington. The only
activity in fact engaged in is to extract money from credulous people and put into their own
pockets." SEN. RE1P. No. 342, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 2. The lobbying registration act
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group opinion can be magnified by instigation of letters, telegrams, and phone
calls to congressmen which, though the sole creation of a special interest
group, create a false impression of opinion in the legislator's home district.
Activities which coerce or corrupt congressmen are a hangover from the
old lobby, and, though of lesser importance, are occasionally resorted to.
Included in this category are such crude devices as bribery, threats, and
promises of financial security, as well as the subtler techniques of social
pressure.
2 6
PUBLIC UTILTis-A CASE STUDY
The extent to which pressure groups engage in all forms of lobbying activi-
ties is well illustrated by the tremendous campaign of the public utility com-
panies against government regulation or ownership. 7 The investigation by
the Federal Trade Commission in 1928-9 uncovered the expenditure of mil-
lions of dollars in a propaganda and educational program that achieved such
proportions that the FTC was forced to conclude "that no campaign ap-
proaching it in magnitude has ever been conducted except possibly by gov-
ernments in wartime." 2s
The campaign was carried on under the direction of a Joint Committee of
National Utility Associations which laid down the policy for twenty-eight
state utility committees. Every effort was made to win newspapers to the
Utilities viewpoint and techniques included placement of huge advertising
contracts, social favors to editors and entertainment of newsmen, wide
distribution of pamphlets and "clip sheets." An annual expenditure of over
thirty million dollars a year in advertising proved an effective weapon. Fi-
nancial support to news and editorial services, without disclosure to the
public, also aided in achieving general newspaper support. Articles written
by state publicity directors were placed in newspapers under the names of
proposed by Senator Caraway, upon which the present Act is modeled, was aimed primarily
at this type of activity. The problem is also recognized by the Joint Committee in its report
to the Senate. SEe. R P. No. 1400 at 27.
26. The "social lobby" operates upon the legislator's desire to associate v,with the best
in Washington society. No direct pressure is commonly put upon him. He is invited to the
"right" parties, is wined, dined and entertained by the "right people." It is subtly suggested
that he vote the "right" way. If he does not he is likely to have a dull time at the next con-
gressional session. Its force and effect is almost impossible to estimate and it is doubtful if
it is susceptible to control by any means at all. A good description of its operation can be
found in CRAwFORD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 16 el seq.
27. See SEN. Doc. No. 92, pt. 71, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. (1928) (Report of FTC on propa-
ganda methods of public utilities); Hearings before a Special Committee to Imestigate Lob!,%ing
Activities, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) pt. 3. A summary of the activities can be found in
BLAISDELL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 152-162.
28. SEN. Doc. No. 92, supra note 27, at 18.
29. Id. at 92 (listing the services). Even more direct control of the press vas attained.
In 1928, the International Paper Co., a subsidiary of International Paper and Power Co.,
secured stock control of ten important newspapers. The International Paper Co., which
justified its control as a campaign for newsprint, realized over half its net income from water
power holdings as compared to roughly one third from the pulp business. Id. at 85-8.
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prominent men who had no apparent connection with utility interests,
A program of close cooperation with schools was likewise inaugurated so,
as "to fix the truth about utilities in the young person's mind before incorrect
notions become fixed there." 10 Friendly relations were cultivated with edu-
cators who were paid salaries during vacations to "learn the public utilities
business at first hand." 31 Funds for research were made available to insti-
tutions. Textbooks representing a viewpoint favorable to utilities were
introduced in public schools, and supplemented with pamphlets prepared
by the state committees.
Public speakers representinj the utility position made speeches before all
types of audiences which were often later carried by newspapers as news
stories.32 The rather narrow popular base of the group was widened and
made more effective by increased sale of stock throughout the country."3
Amidst this publicity campaign highly paid Washington representatives
were busy contacting congressmen and exerting pressure on influential gov-
ernment officials. Such activity reached its height immediately prior to the
vote on the Public Utility Holding Company Act, in opposition to which the
utility lobby spent over four million dollars. Ex-legislators were employed
to influence their former colleagues, aid of the social lobby was enlisted, and
a deluge of telegrams, sent without the knowledge or consent of the signers,
4
swamped wavering congressmen. It was this latter practice that moved
Congressman Driscoll to inaugurate the subsequent investigation of the
lobbying activities connected with the Holding Company Bill.
Passage of the Bill did not put an end to pressure group opposition which
merely shifted its primary target from legislature to courts. Literally dozens
of suits were filed by utility companies alleging the unconstitutionality of
the Act.35 Similarly the competition offered by government through the
Tennessee Valley Authority was widely fought in the courts.36
30. Id. at 141. The Utility program for education is summarized at pp. 139-221.
31. Id. at 149. 0
32. ". . . matter that might be classified as strictly propaganda and thus barred from
the news columns of the big dailies, actually did find its way into those papers because, being
delivered by a speaker before a civic organization of standing in the community, it became
news and was printed as such." Id. at 78.
33. Very little of this stock carried voting privileges. For example, less than 2% of the
shares sold in 1925-26 and 7% in 1924-5 were voting shares. Sale of 10,000 shares in Ala-
bama changed the whole tone of newspaper editorials and in California the 150,000 stock-
holders of the utilities were the most significant factor in defeating a state water power pro-
gram. Id. at 11, 307.
34. See, for example, Hearings, supra note 27, at 1007 et seg. The holding company
system spent about $134,000 instigating these last minute telegrams and phone messages,
Names were taken directly from phone directories and signed to telegrams. Discovery of
fake messages may have turned the tide and made possible the passage of the bill. It passed
the Senate by a single vote.
35. By agreement proceedings were stayed in all except one suit. The constitutionality
of the registration provisions of the Act was upheld by the Supreme Court. Electric Bond
and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 (1938).
36. Tenn. Elect. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939). Eighteen power companies
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Today the fight against rural electrification projects goes on apace. On
March 11, 1946, Speaker Rayburn called the attention of Congress to the
fact that the Capitol was "seething with utility lobbyists" out to kill rural
electrification and public owned power in general.V The National Associa-
tion of Electric Companies 3s has spent $192,000 on lobbying activities
between August 2 and October 15, 1946. Its principal lobbyist 3 receives a
salary comparable to that of the President of the United States.
The methods of influencing legislation used by the Public Utilities lobby
are employed to a greater or lesser extent by all national pressure groups.
The problem of lobby regulation is not one of curbing the activities of a
single, or even a few, special interests. It is, rather, the problem of insuring
rational decision when legislators, and the public, are bombarded from all
sides by the demands of hundreds of organizations. Solution to this problem
does not necessarily resolve itself into a choice between suppressing such
propaganda or allowing it to flourish. Exposure of lobbying activities to
informed criticism through disclosure of the source of apparently disinter-
ested statements is one method. The effectiveness of such publicity is well
illustrated by the passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act after
discovery that the bulk of the opposition came from trumped-up Utility
propaganda.
STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING
While the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act represents the first federal
statute passed with the end of bringing lobbying activities into the open, it
has precedent in a number of state laws. In addition to the universal prohi-
bition against giving, offering, or receiving bribes, thirty-five states have
enacted statutes aimed at limiting lobbying abuses. All of these statutes,
while differing in their specific provisions, proceed on the common principle
that undesirable activities can best be controlled, not by prohibition,", but
by publicity.
were involved in the appeal to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the case on the theory
that appellants had no standing before the court.
37. 92 Cong. Rec., March 11, 1946 at 2156. Mr. Rayburn recalled the 1935 fight over
the Holding Company Act, of which he was a sponsor and continued "If they are spoiling
for another brush with me .. .they can get it. . . ." Ibid. The statement resulted in
some agitation for another congressional investigation. See Murray, Inres lgale the Power
Lobby No:o (July 1, 1946) 114 NEw REPUBLIC 917.
38. It is alleged that about 60% of the electric companies are members of the Associa-
tion. It appears to be the successor to the Edison Electric Institute, which, prior to 1933,
operated under the name of the National Electric Light Association. Murray, supra note 37,
at 917.
39.. Purcell L. Smith, one-time Insult man, receives $65,000. He is President of the Na-
tional Association of Electric Companies. Both Mr. Smith and the Association have regis-
tered under the provisions of the Regulation of Lobbying Act.
40. But see NEB. REv. STAT. (1943) § 50-301 and S. D. CODE (1939) § 55.0705 (Limit
scope of activities to appearances before committees, public addresses, newspapers, and
written statements or briefs.).
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The most frequent requirements of state laws 41 are (1) registration, (2)
filing expense accounts, and (3) prohibition of contingent compensation.
The more comprehensive laws require registration of both the individual
lobbyist and his employer with a governmental agency, usually the Secre-
tary of State. Registration statements often include, in addition to name
and address, specification of the legislation promoted or opposed, but here a
very general answer suffices. Several states, following the pattern of the
Massachusetts statute, 42 make a distinction between "legislative agent" and
"legislative counsel," but this differentiation appears to serve no functional
burpose.
In seventeen states the employer and lobbyist must also file detailed state-
ments showing the amounts received and expended in promoting or opposing
41.
• Laws Limited to Registration Distinction Between Financial Continge tn Com.












Indiana x x x
Iowa
Kansas x x x
Kentucky x x
Louisiana x
Maine x x x
Maryland x x x






Nebraska x x x
Nevada
New Hampshire x x
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York x x x
North Carolina x x
North Dakota x
Ohio x x x
Oklahoma x
OregonPennsylvania
RhodeIsland x x x
South Carolina x x







West VirginiaWiscnsin x x x
Wyoming
The table is adapted from Zeller, Slate Regulation of Legislative Lobbying in 5 CouNcIL
oF STATE GOVERM MENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1944) 161, 165-6.
42. MASS. LAWS (1932) c. 3 § 39. For interpretations of the statute see (1896) 1 Or.
Arr'Y GEN. (Mass.) 311; (1912) 3 id. 469.
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legislation, including an affidavit as to the agent's salary. These expense ac-
counts are usually submitted from one to four months after the close of the
legislative session and are open to public inspection.
The frequent provision forbidding compensation which is contingent upon
the success of the lobbyist in attaining the desired legislation is merely legis-
lative condemnation of a contract which courts have long regarded as op-
posed to the public interest and unenforceable. 43
A major weakness of all state statutes is the lack of adequate enforcement
provisions. Although criminal sanctions are imposed for violation of the
registration requirements, no special agency is charged with investigating
either the accuracy or inclusiveness of the registration lists and financial
statements. That Attorneys General have exhibited no particular desire to
bring actions except in the case of flagrant violations accompanied by wide
publicity is indicated by the wide variation in the number registering from
state to state and year to year, and the absence of entries of large sums in
expense accounts.44 A conclusion that the law is broken with impunity is
inescapable.
45
The failure of states to regulate pressure group activities successfully has
often been attributed to lack of a specific statutory definition of "lobbying."
43. Noonan v. Gilbert, 68 F. (2d) 775 (App. D. C., 1934); Geselischaft fur Drahtlose
Telegraphie v. Brown, 78 F. (2d) 410 (App. D. C., 1935); Coquillard's Adm'r. v. Bearss,
21 Ind. 479 (1863). But courts have not always seen fit to distinguish cases where the com-
pensation was contingent from those where it was not. The early practice was to refuse to
enforce any contracts for influencing legislation. See Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall.
45 (U. S. 1864); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853); Hazelton v.
Sheckells, 202 U. S. 71 (1906). In recent years a few courts have enforced the contract when
compensation was not contingent. Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Ore. 357, 190 Pac. 141 (1920);
Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. IN. 520 (1923); Stroemer v. Van 0rsdel, 74 Neb.
132, 103 N. NV. 1053 (1905); Notes (1940) 15 Ia. L. J. 230; (1933) 12 TEX. L. REv. 85;
(1934) 14 BosT. U. L. REv. 834; (1922) 7 CoRN. L. Q. 361. It is questionable if there is any
functional basis for the distinction between the two types of lobbying contracts. It is more
likely that courts denouncing lobbyists have thought in terms of the corrupt practices of
the old lobby, while courts recognizing the less reprehensible lobbying of more recent times
as a legitimate occupation have sought a ground for differentiation in the fact of contingent
compensation.
44. In 1941 registrations varied from four in Georgia to 950 in 11rkconsin. Zeller,
supra note 41, at 163. Professor Zeller's study of New York pressure groups revealed a total
of only $103,796 (exclusive of lobbyists' salaries) spent in 1935 according to registration
statements. Registrations over the preceding ten years varied from 75 to 145. Many of the
groups registering failed to file expense statements. ZELLER, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 254-6.
An earlier study of state registrations revealed that in Ohio all the expense accounts filed
bore the same legend "received nothing and spent nothing." Pollock, The Regudation of
Lobbying (1927) 21 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 335, 339. See also, Zink, Indiana Lobby-Control
Found 1sufficient (1938) 27 NAT. Munic. Rv. 543.
45. The only state which seems to have been at all successful with lobbying legislation
is Wisconsin, where registrations always exceed those of other states. The Wisconsin statute
is not significantly different from other legislation, and NIrisconsin does not appear to have
convicted any offenders. Annotations to state statutes indicate that there have been no
appeals from conviction under anti-lobbying laws.
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Legislators drawing up state laws appear to regard lobbying as limited to the
old methods of face-to-face persuasion with its accompanying graft and cor-
ruption, and give inadequate consideration to modern propaganda and pub-
licity techniques. Even the most comprehensive laws emphasize the activi-
ties of the lobbyist rather than the pressure group he represents. This inter-
pretation is most clearly indicated when statutes use such expressions as "to
personally influence," 41 "privately or secretly attempt to influence," 41 or
"improperly influence" Is to define lobbying practices. Not only the phrase-
ology of the acts but their total divorcement from such analagous problems
as .corrupt election practices, improvement of legislative information serv-
ices, and functional representation indicate that these statutes were directed
at what was conceived to be an isolated evil which needed regulation. The
failure, therefore, lies not merely in the inadequacy of statutory language,
but in the more basic fault of which lack of precise definition is a manifesta-
tion: the inability of state legislatures to see pressure group regulation in its
relation to the whole decision-making process.
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Legislative Background:
Just as the impetus to state legislation came from the disclosures of the
Armstrong Committee's investigation of New York insurance companies in
1905-6, the most serious attempts at federal regulation have followed revela-
tion of lobbying activities by the N.A.M. in 1913 on proposed tariff legisla-
tion,49 and by the public utilities in 1928 and 1936.50 Bills introduced by
Senator Caraway " in 1928 and Senator Black 62 and Representative Smith 6
in 1936 passed their respective houses but did not meet with the approval of
Congress. Their failure of passage has usually been ascribed to congressiona l
fear of interference with the constitutional right to petition and opposition of
lobbyists to registration requirements. To this might be added a belief by
congressmen that they are not susceptible to group pressures.
46. IDAHO CODE AN.T. (1932) § 17-607.
47. LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) § 9279.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1941) § 89.
49. Denunciation of lobbying activities in connection with the tariff by President Wll-
son led to investigations by both the Senate and the House. The Senate Committee did not
file a report although several volumes of testimony were taken. One member of the House
was censured for "grave acts of improper influence" but no direct corruption was proven.
See H. R. REP. No. 113, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1913).
50. Seenote 27 supra.
51. S. 1095, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). The bill was reported out of committee after
accusations on the floor of the Senate of public utility lobbying in connection with the Walsh
resolution to investigate public utility financing. See 69 CONG. Rrc. 2893-4 (1928).
52. S. 2512, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936). The text of the bill can be found in 80
CONG. Rrc. 4970 (1936).
53. H. R. 11663, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936). The text of the bill can be found in
80 CONG. REc. 4533-41 (1936).
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The report of the House committee in 1913 defined lobbying as the "ac-
tivities of a person or body of persons seeking to influence Congress in any
way whatever" .4 and this broad definition has been incorporated directly or
indirectly in subsequent bills. But despite the broad possibilities of such a
definition, none of the afore-mentioned legislative proposals showed any at-
tempt to deviate from the rather narrow conceptions embodied in state stat-
utes. The Caraway, Black, and Smith bills focused their attention upon the
activities of the Washington representatives rather than the pressure groups
themselves, and were particularly concerned about the lobbying of specious
organizations. 5 Senator Black's investigation of airmail contracts prompted
him to expand the Caraway proposals to include lobbying before adminis-
trative agencies.5"
Although the wording of the 1946 Act is almost identical with that of its
predecessors, there is evidence that the views of the present Congress toward
lobbying are significantly broader than those of the past. The Act studiously
avoids use of the word "lobbying" and the committee reports refer to the
activities of "pressure groups" and their "agents," emphasis being given to
the activities of the former. 57 The unfortunate identity of language between
the instant Act and the Black and Smith bills is not solely explicable in terms
of congressional intent; it is attributable largely to the speed which marked
the drafting of the Reorganization Act, s the indifference with which legisla-
54. H. R. REP. No. 113, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1913) 15.
55. See note 25 supra. It is likewise apparent that Senator Black saw registration of
lobbyists largely as a device to cure improper lobbying practices. Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2512, 74th Cong., 1st Sees. (1935) 14-5.
56. The Black Bill proposed that lobbyists before the legislature register with the
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate and those before administrative agencies
with the Federal Trade Commission.
57. SEN. REn. No. 1011, 26-7; SEN. REP. No. 1400, 4-5. The Act was intended to in-
clude three types of lobbyists: (1) "Those who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propa-
ganda from all over the country ...... " (2) ". . . those who are employed to come to the
Capitol under the false impression that they exert some powerful influence over Members of
Congress." (3) ". . . entirely honest and respectable representatives of business, profes-
sional, and philanthropic organizations who come to Washington openly and frankly to ex-
press their views for or against legislation . . . ." Id. at 27.
But the importance of clever Washington representatives with the "right contacts"
should not be underestimated. On August 21, 1929, William B. Shearer filed a complaint to
recover $257,655 due him from three American shipbuilders for lobbying activities. He
contended that eight cruisers were built as the result of his efforts. Odegard, supra note 23
at 690. The ethics of such representatives is sometimes questionable even when no bribery
is shown to exist. When Senator Black's Committee to investigate airmail and ocean mail
contracts subpoenaed certain records, the Washington lobbyist and lawyer for the airlines,
William P. McCracken Jr. destroyed them. Despite conviction on a contempt charge,
Mr. McCracken lost no prestige in the eyes of the air line operators or the bar association.
See CRAwFoaD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 158-9.
58. The Act was drawn up by the Office of Legislative Counsel.The Joint Committee
wished congressional action before adjournment and a minimum of time was devoted to
drafting the Act. The only indication of congressional intent given the Office was the brief
description provided by the Committee's recommendations as shown in Senate Report 1011.
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tors regarded the lobbying provisions, and the political expediency of avoid-
ing too sharp a break from past attempts.
The clearest indication that the Lobbying Act represents a more mature
congressional view of the pressure group problem is provided by its enact-
ment as part of the Reorganization Act. The fact that it does not come as
the result of demand for restrictive regulation following an expos6 by a con-
gressional committee is further proof that Congress intended more than
elimination of some of the more obvious abuses of the right to petition. A
proper evaluation of the Act can only be made if it is regarded as an initial
step toward solution of the problem of fitting the activities of organized
groups into existing patterns of government.
The structure of the Lobbying Act indicates its composite origin. Section
308, a slightly modified version of the Black Bill, relates to the activities of
those engaged in lobbying for pay. Sections 303, 304, and 305, modeled after
the Smith proposal, cover the financing of lobbying through solicitation of
contributions, or expenditure of funds, to influence legislation. Section 307,
also from the Smith Bill, is a catch-all provision defining persons to whom
the Act applies.
As in the analogous state statutes, the law establishes requirements for
registration and provides for public disclosure of pressure group activities.
But the vagueness of its provisions and the absence of any attempt to define
directly the activities it seeks to regulate has led to much confusion as to
who must register or file financial statements under the terms of the Act.
The refusal of the Attorney General 19 to render an official interpretation has
left individuals and organizations the obligation of deciding for themselves
whether or not the law is applicable to them.
Registration of Professional Lobbyists:
Section 308(a) provides that "Any person who shall engage himself for pay
or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the pas-
sage or defeat of any legislation . . . shall, before doing anything in further-
ance of such object, register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives
and the Secretary of the Senate. . ... " Although "person" is defined else-
where 60 to include both individuals and groups, it seems clear that this sec-
tion refers primarily to the individual lobbyist or legislative agent.
Certain exceptions to this provision should be noted. It does not apply to
(1) persons who merely appear before a committee and "engage in no other
activities to influence legislation"; (2) public officials acting in their official
capacity; (3) newspapermen "acting in the regular course of business"; and
The Black Bill presented a convenient model and was, therefore, utilized. Communication
to YALE LAw JouRNAl, from Charles F. Boots, Office of Legislative Counsel, October 18,
1946.
59. See 31 UrTErD STATES NEWS (Sept. 6, 1946) 70.
60. Section 302 (c).
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(4) persons now required to report under the provisions of the Corrupt Prac-
tices Act."'
Construed by itself, Section 308 sets up two conditions which must be sat-
isfied before a person need register; he must be employed by another for a
valuable consideration, and the purpose of the employment must be to in-
fluence legislation. But a difficulty arises as to whether this section, as well
as the section which requires the organization to file an expense account, can
be read alone or must be construed in the light of Section 307 which reads, in
part, as follows:
"The provisions of this title shall apply to any person who . . .
directly or indirectly solicits, collects, or receives money or any
other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principat
purpose of whick person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of
the following purposes:
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States.
(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of
any legislation by the Congress of the United States." (Emphasis
sfipplied.)
An interpretation of the Act which regards this section as qualifying all
others would appear to have the support of legislative intent. On the ffoor of
the House it was referred to by a m&mber of the Committee as containing
"the gist of the antilobbying provision." 62 Furthermore, unless this section
is read literally as restricting the application of the Act, the phraseology in
italics above is surplusage and serves no useful purpose.
The superimposition of the language of Section 307 upon that of 308 leaves
a third condition which must be fulfilled before registration is required: not
only must the person be engaged for pay to influence legislation, but this
must also be his principal activity. Although it is probable that most of the
professional lobbyists in Washington could meet all three of these conditions
and be required to register, there are at least three fairly common fact situa-
tions which may cause difficulty.
The first, and quantitatively the most important, of these situations is the
case of the Washington lawyer, or law firm, who is retained by a special inter-
est group or corporation to advise on pending legislation, render opinions as
to its effect and construction, and possibly to draft bills which the group will
submit to Congress. This work may be part of a large law practice.
The second situation is that of the officer of a corporation whose general
duties have no reference to legislative matters but who comes to Washington
to oppose a specific bill which may adversely affect the interests of his firm.
61. A list of exceptions is given in SEm. REP. No. 1400 at 26. The fact that the lan-
guage of exclusion in section 308 does not include radio commentators within the general
exemption given to the press raises the possibility that some broadcasters vill have to regis-
ter. Up until October 15, 1946, no radio commentators had registered.
62. See Remarks of Representative Dirksen in 92 Cong. Rec., July 25, 1946. at 10138.
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He speaks to congressmen, testifies before committees, and distributes litera-
ture. Immediately after the passage or defeat of the bill he returns to his
usual duties.
The third problem is that presented by the member of a group who comes
to Washington to testify before a committee, distributes literature to con-
gressmen, and takes his local Representative to dinner. The group pays his
expenses but nothing more.
It is probable that the lawyer would not have to register. Although the
phrase "influencing legislation" is a broad one, it is not within the legislative
intent to include activities of counsel who merely perform advisory func-
tions.6"
The corporate officer would, on the other hand, have to register before he
undertook to engage in such typical lobbying activities. He might, of course,
argue that he was not employed to influence legislation and that this was not
his principal activity. But it is reasonable to assume that at least part of his
corporate duties are of this nature and thus part of his compensation is
derived for such activities. He is acting in his official capacity and not as an
individual since it is the interests of the corporation which are affected by the
pending legislation. Likewise, it is apparent that the word "principal" can be
defined only if given a time reference. Although over a long period of time
his principal activity maybe with other corporate affairs, nevertheless his
principal activity during his Washington stay is representing the corporate
interest before legislators.64 This same rationale would apply to the lawyer
in the first example if he went beyond interpreting legislation and approached
congressmen, or if he himself submitted the drafted bill to a member of the
legislature.
The representative of the interest group in the third illustration would not
have to register. Although he meets the requirements of "influencing legis-
lation" and "principal activity," he is not engaged for pay. The intent of
Congress was not to limit in any way the individual's right to petition and
was aimed only at professional lobbyists." If the compensation were merely
actual expenses, it would not meet this test of employment for consideration,
but if the sum given should substantially exceed expenses, he would have to
register.
It may be difficult in any given case to determine just what constitutes
63. Many state statutes specifically exempt lawyers who do not personally approach
legislators and confine their activities to interpreting and analyzing legislative proposals.
Even in the absence of statutory exemption analogous state laws have been deemed inap-
plicable to attorneys engaged in a purely advisory capacity. See (1937) 26 Or. A-r'v GEN.
(Wisc.) 183-4.
64. Analogous provisions of the Caraway and Smith bills have been interpreted by legis-
lators to this effect. See 69 CoNG. REc. 3932 (1928); 80 CONG. REc. 4521 (1936). Further-
more, such interpretation has been given to state statutes. See (1937) REP. Ar' , GEN.
(Mass.) 59-60; (1915) 1 Op. ATTY GEN. (Ohio) 41.
65. See 92 Cong. Rec., June 10, 1946, at 6676-8. A similar provision in the New York
statute has been interpreted to this effect. (1939) REP. Ar'v GEN, (N. Y.) 233-4.
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"influencing legislation." 61 The Act is indefinite in this respect and, since
criminal statutes must define prohibited acts with certainty, this indefinite-
ness might make it technically defective. It is more likely, however, that
courts will construe the provision strictly and require proof of actual intent
on the part of an organization or individual to promote or defeat passage of a
definite legislative proposal. Sufficient intent might, for example, be indi-
cated by the presence of a legislative program endorsed and advocated by
the group or its representative.
Filing of Expense Accounts:
A. By the Lobbyist:
Every person who registers under Section 308 is required to file in addition
to the registration form a detailed report under oath of all money received
and ex pended by him during the preceding calendar quarterFr The report
includes a statement identifying the person paid, the purposes for which the
money was expended, and the legislation he is paid to support or oppose.
He also must state the names of any papers or periodicals in which he has
caused editorial or news matter to be published.
B. By the group or organization:
Section 305(a) provides that "Every person receiving any contributions or
expending any money" to influence legislation must file a detailed statement
every calendar quarter with the Clerk of the House. The term "person"
again is defined to include any individual or group of persons, corporation,
partnership or association, but excludes anyone registering under the Cor-
rupt Practices Act3
66. A literal interpretation of the Act might well result in fantastic requirements,
which, through the bulk of registrations, would only destroy its already feeble publicity pro-
visions. Technically an agency which placed advertising in newspapers might be required to
register, together with the person who composed the advertisement and the corporate officer
in charge of public relations. Political science professors at educational institutions might
be construed to be indirectly influencing legislation through their critiques of e.'sting law's.
Such unrealistic interpretations are to a great extent limited by construction of the Act to
require that it be a '!principal" activity. Since it was the congressional intent to require
registration by those who are commonly designated "professional lobbyists" it would seem
that the language used is unfortunately broad. There seems no reason why this provision
should not be limited to persons directly approaching Congressmen for the purpose of de-
feating or promoting legislation. The activities of other individuals would be included in
the expense accounts of the organization filing under § 305.
67. This would include sums spent in entertaining congressmen, buying them meals or
giving dinners in their honor. Such an interpretation is supported by Senator Black's an-
alysis of his bill which employs the same language as the instant Act. See Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Commitee of the Judiciary on S. 2512, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 12-3.
68. A literal interpretation of the language of section 305 would require compliance of
the professional lobbyists who register under section 308 with this provision as well. Since
the information required here is substantially the same as required under section 303, such a
1947]
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As in the case of individual lobbyists the provisions of Section 305 are
limited by Section 307.9 Thus construed, only those organizations which
solicit money or receive contributions principally to aid in the influencing of
legislation, or those receiving or expending money whose principal purpose is
to influence, directly or indirectly, legislation must register.70 Obviously
the efficacy of the provision hinges on judicial interpretation of the word
"principal."
Past congressional investigations have disclosed the fact that the most
important pressure groups today are the National Association of Manufac-
turers, the Chamber of Commerce, the AF of L, the CIO, various trade and
professional associations,. labor groups, farm associations, and veterans'
organizations. All of these special interests could argue that their principal
activity is dissemination of information within the group for business or so-
cial purposes, trade promotion, or research, and that their lobbying activ-
ities, however extensive, are not the principal purpose of the organization
71
Such an interpretation would completely emasculate the Act; almost no
group which exercises a substantial influence over public or legislative opin-
ion would be required to register. Groups spending hundreds of thousands of
dollars in propaganda activities would be exempt from reporting such ex-
penditures, while other groups spending only insignificant sums would have
to submit detailed accounts.
Despite the fact that a literal interpretation of "principal" makes little
sense in the light of the factual situation, a strong argument to support this
construction would appear unnecessarily strict. The seeming double coverage serves to
emphasize the unfortunate looseness and ambiguity of the provisions of the Act.
There is, however, the possibility that persons who would register under section 308
except for the exclusionary language might have to register under section 305 if they met its
requirements. Here there would be no problem of duplicate filing.
69. If this limitation is not applied, section 305 would become so comprehensive as to
lead to absurd results. Any person receiving any contributions or expending any money to
influence legislation would include, for example, not only a pressure group, but every indi-
vidual contributor as well as any person mailing a letter or sending a telegram to his con-
gressman.
70. One other possible construction should be noted. Section 307 could be construed as
making solicitation, collection or receipt of money the essential factor. In this case only
persons soliciting, collecting or receiving money would register, and then only if the money
is used principally to influence legislation, or if lobbying is the principal purpose of such
person.
71. In debate on the floor Senator Hawkes (N. J.) asked Senator LaFollette if the Act
would require registration by the Chamber of Commerce. When he received a non-comnmital
answer he expressed the opinion that organizations of this type would be excluded by the
"principal" requirement. He was not supported in this interpretation by the sponsors of
the bill. Despite Senator LaFollette's assurance that no stigma was attached to registration,
Senator Hawkes persisted in regarding it as a penalty. See 92 Cong. Rec., July 26, 1946, at
10286-87. Commentators have expressed the opinion that the Chamber of Commerce and
labor unions would have to register under the analogous provisions of the Black Bill. Mech-
ling, supra note 13, at 329. Senator Hawkes is a former President of the Chamber of Com-
merce.
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view can be made from the legislative history of Section 307. The Smith Bill,
from which the section was copied almost verbatim, originally used the
phraseology "in whole or in part," and its sponsor substituted the word
"principally" when the breadth of the former provision was brought to his
attention. When asked whether labor and fraternal organizations would
have to register, Representative Smith replied in the negative. He stated
that the provision was intended to exclude many large organizations with
thousands and millions of members who spent only a minor part of their
funds influencing legislation.
72
In debate on the instant Act it was stated that the groups which were in-
cluded in this section were "those whose principal purpose, not incidental
purpose" was "to influence the passage of legislation." 73 Juxtaposition of
the words "principal" and "incidental" indicates that all purposes of an
organization which are not "incidental" are in the category covered by the
Act, suggesting a much broader meaning of the word "principal" than it
might be given if taken alone.
A classification of activities which only incidentally influence legislation
can be found in cases construing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.7j 4
Tax exemption is provided for gifts to charitable and educational organiza-
tions "no substantial part of the activities of which is . . . attempting to
influence legislation." The test imposed by the courts has been whether or
not the political activity is incidental to the main purposes of the organiza-
tion,75 and relevant criteria include its stated purpose as determined by the
articles of association, 6 the amount expended in political activities as con-
trasted with other business,' r the presence or absence of a political program,8
72. See 80 CONG. REc. 4535, 9752 (1936).
73. "What we are trying to do here is to reach those whose principal purpoze, not inci-
dental purpose, but whose principal purpose is to come here and endeavor to influence the
passage of legislation either by bringing about its defeat or its enactment." 92 Cong. Rec.,
July 25, 1946, at 10138. The statement was made by Representative Dirksen, a member of
the committee. See also SEN. REP. No. 1400, 27 ("... does not apply to organizations
formed for other purposes whose efforts to influence legislation are merely incidental to the
purposes for which formed."). This portion of the Senate report was taken directly from
remarks by Representative Smith on the floor of the House in 1936. See 80 CONG. REc. 9751
(1936).
74. Ir. REV. CODE §§ 23 (0) (2), 812 (d). 1004 (a) (2) (B). These sections codify a
long standing Treasury Regulation employing the same language.
75. A leading case also employs the language "mediate to the primary purpoe" and
"ancillary to the end in chief." Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 84, 183 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1930). See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1938).
76. Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (bequest to Man-
hattan Single Tax Club taxable); Joseph M. Price, 12 B. T. A. 1186 (1928) (contribution to
City Club of New York held taxable).
77. Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941); Faulkner v.
Commissioner, 112 F. (2d) 987 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Charles W. Dahlinger, 20 B. T. A. 176
(1930).
78. Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931); James J. Forstall,
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and the controversial nature of the propaganda promulgated.70 Under these
rules gifts to trade associations, labor unions, professional groups, and social
reform organizations have been deemed taxable8 0 Although the analogy of
the instant problem to taxation is far from perfect, neither the classification
of groups nor-the criteria imposed seem entirely inapposite.
If a test case should bring Section 307 before the courts for judicial con-
struction, any one of three results is possible. The court could construe
"principal" narrowly to mean "primary," "chief" or "most important."
Although this interpretation would exempt most pressure groups and vitiate
the Act it would, nevertheless, have the support of Representative Smith's
remarks, coupled with legal dogma requiring a strict construction of criminal
statutes. Where, as in the case of the typical trade association or labor union,
more than one activity is engaged in, the burden of proof upon the govern-
ment to establish lobbying as the most important activity would seem to
preclude many convictions. Exactly what the government would have to
prove, assuming the difficulties of obtaining evidence were overcome, is
largely a matter of conjecture; if the objective test of comparison of sums
spent on lobbying with sums spent on other activities were adopted, would
it be necessary to prove that more was expended on lobbying than any other
activity or than all other activities, and over what period of time would it be
necessary to compare such expenditures?
An interpretation of "principal" to mean "substantial," or any activity
not purely "incidental," would overcome most of the objections to which the
narrower construction is subject and has'already proved workable in tax
cases. While the problem of the correct time'reference would still be present,
the breadth of activities included would make it factually insignificant.
Furthermore, this interpretation is the only one which appears reasonable in
the light of the pressure group problem as apparently understood by the
present Congress.
The third possible result of litigation would be a holding that Section 307
is so vague and indefinite as to require invalidation of the Act.8 ' There is
29 B. T. A. 428 (1933); John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B. T. A. 463 (1932); Frederic C. Leubuscher,
.21 B. T. A. 1022 (1930); Appeal of Herbert E. Fales, 9 B. T. A. 828 (1927).
79. Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932); Henriette T.
Noyes, 31 B. T. A. 121 (1934); J. Noah H. Slee, 15 B. T. A. 710 (1929).
80. A list of organizations subject to, or exempt from, the tax can be found in 5 M.R-
TENS, LAW OF FED. INCOME TAXATION (1942) §§ 31.14-31.31. See also Note (1942) 138
A. L. R. 456.
81. A similar use of the word "principally" in defining a wholesale produce dealer as
one who sold principally to others than consumers was held invalid for indefiniteness by a
Wisconsin court. That court was particularly concerned over the fact that no provision was
made for an average period of activity against which a test could be applied. State ex rel.
Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111 (1926). See also United States v. Petrillo,
(N. D. Il1. Dec. 2, 1946) (holding Lea Act unconstitutional because phrase "needed
by such licensee to perform actual services" was so vague as to violate due process clause of
the Fifth amendment).
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little practical difference in a strict interpretation of the word "principal"
and a holding that Section 307 violates the Constitution; in either case the
operative effect of the Act would be negligible.
It should be noted that there is no interrelation between those who file
statements under Section 305 and those who register under Section 308 as is
common in state statutes. Thus, it is possible for an individual lobbyist to
name an employer who need not file under Section 305.82 But if liberal inter-
pretation is given to the word "principal," the correlation between the two
lists should be high.
The quarterly statement of the group filed under Section 305 includes the
name and address of all who contribute over $500, the total sum of all con-
tributions and the total expenditures including the name and address of
those who receive an aggregate of ten dollars or more. Further provisions E
require that detailed accounts of contributions and expenditures be kept and
preserved for at least two years.
Enforcement.
Violations of any provisions of the Act are punishable by a fine not ex-
ceeding $5000 and imprisonment for not more than twelve months.84 In ad-
dition, conviction automatically disqualifies a person from attempting to
influence legislation or testifying before a committee for three years with
more severe penalties provided for violation of this provision. Although this
latter sanction appears to be directed at the individuals registering under
Section 308, the broad statutory definition of "person" makes it applicable
to associations and groups as well. How it could be enforced against the
latter is not clear, and in any event it could scarcely bind the individual
members of a group without deprivation of their constitutional rights.
THE REQUIREmENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE LOBBYING STATUTE
The inadequacies of the Regulation of Lobbying Act are in large measure
attributable to the fact that despite evidence of a new and realistic congres-
sional understanding of the problems raised by pressure group activity, the
statutory vehicle for expression of its ideas was hurriedly drafted and
modeled on anachronistic precedent. That the federal statute will be little
more successful than its state counterparts is already indicated by the num-
ber of individuals and groups complying with its provisions. During the
first quarter 36 organizations and 124 individuals filed statements under
Sections 305 and 308. Only three important pressure groups complied with
82. This was also the interpretation of a member of the Joint Committee. See 92 Cong.
Rec., July 25, 1946, at 10138.
83. Sections 303, 304, 306. The speed with which the bill .as drafted and the lack of
attention given to its language are illustrated by the use in § 304 of the passive rather than
active voice so as to make the section technically meaningless.
84. Section 310.
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Section 305, others apparently relying on exemption by virtue of the "prin-
cipal" requirement.85
The most obvious weaknesses of the Act are the use of the word "princi-
pal" to restrict persons to whom the Act is applicable and the lack of
adequate enforcement provisions. Such powerful pressure groups as the
Chamber of Commerce and the NAM are construing the word narrowly and
maintain that their principal purposes are trade promotion, education and re-
search.8 6 Failure to submit accounts to the Clerk of the House indicates that
most trade associations and labor organizations are adopting the same view.
Although a test case might possibly result in an interpretation which would
force their compliance, it would be preferable to amend the law so as to in-
clude all organizations which spend more than a specified sum influencing
legislation.
Failure to provide sanctions to overcome the procedural difficulty of crimi-
nally prosecuting- unincorporated associations is an elementary drafting
error87 which may seriously weaken the punitive provisions of the Act. As a
consequence it is questionable 88 whether a large proportion of pressure
groups could be nade subject to its penalties, a shortcoming best cured by
providing that all expense accounts be signed by a responsible executive who
is personally liable for violation. If no expense account is submitted, the
officers of the association should be held.
The enforcement difficulties of the Act, however, are more extensive than
those embodied in a mere technical drafting error. The Department of Jus-
tice will undertake prosecution of violators of the Act only when a violation
,85. The important groups registering, with their total expenses, were as follows: Na-
tional Association of Electric Companies ($192,000); American Medical Association ($19,-
000); National Home and Property Owners Association ($87,000). All of these groups have
recently been in the limelight as a result of their lobbying activities. Lobbying by public
utilities was denounced during the last congressional session by Speaker Rayburn, that of
the Medical Association by Senator Murray, and that of the real estate lobby by President
Truman.
The small number of individual registrants is explicable in view of the congressional
recess and the lack of opportunity to approach legislators. Average salaries of those who
have registered are from $5000 to $7000, highest being that of Smith (public utilities) with
$65,000, not all of which was for utility lobbying. Expense allowances varied from "un-
limited" (Smith) to "none," "actual" expenses being the most frequent entry.
86. Memorandum prepared by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C., August 28, 1946.
87. The same error was made in drafting analogous provisions in the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938. 52 STAT. 631 (1938), 22 U. S. C. § 611 (Supp. 1941-1946). Thils
weakness was pointed out by the Institute of Living Law. See 87 Cox'o. Rnc. Apr. A4417
(1941). The loophole was closed by the McKellar-Sumner amendment in 1942. Officers and
directors were made personally liable for failure to file expense statements. 56 STAr. 256
(1942), 22 U. S. C. § 617 (Supp. 1941-1946).
88. But see Clark, J., concurring in United States v. Local 807 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters,- 118 F. (2d) 684, 688 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) aff'd 315 U. S. 521 (1942) (un-
incorporated associations may be subject to criminal prosecution where that is legislative
intent).
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is brought to its attention. The absence of provision for a special agency to
investigate the activities of lobbyists has always meant non-compliance with
state laws; there is no reason to believe that there will be a significant differ-
ence in the case of a federal statute.
One of the principal reasons for requiring registration of professional
lobbyists was to reveal, in addition to their identity, the size and cohesion of
the groups they claimed to represent. Such kmowledge is indispensable to
legislators seeking to evaluate the political force of divergent views. To this
end the Senate Report recommended that the registration statement include
evidence of bonafide membership ;S9 but this provision was never embodied
in the bill as submitted to Congress. Not only should this information be
required but it should be supplemented by a statement as to how the mem-
bership decides its lobbying policy and by what right the lobbyist speaks for
the group. Democratic procedures within the group itself are necessary if
lobbying activities are to be regarded as a legitimate manifestation of a
functional need.y
The instant Act confines itself to persons who exert pressure on Congress.
The decline of Congress as a policy making body and the increased discre-
tion exercised by administrative bodies have, however, effected a parallel
shift in lobbying activities. No adequate law can ignore the pressures upon
all branches of government, and registration of all those who lobby before
governmental agencies should be included within the provisions of the Act. l
The need for a specific enforcement agency:
Evolution of lobbying methods has made regulation of pressure groups
primarily a problem in propaganda control. Control by either quantitative
89. SEN. REP. No. 1011 at 27. The statement as to the "bona fide total membership"
of organizations was apparently left out of the Act by mere oversight in drafting attributable
to the fact that it was copied from the corresponding section of the Black Bill.
90. See Statement of George Smith, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Ornari-
zation of Congress pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 411. The same
opinion has been stated by John Thomas Taylor, legislative agent of the American Legion.
Colonel Taylor has publicly supported the bill, but feels that its many loopholes make it an
inadequate solution to the problem of lobbying. In addition to the %,eaknesses already
enumerated, he points out that the "social lobby" remains uncontrolled, that government
officials often lobby for bills with which they have no official connection, that a lobbyist
could screen his activities by becoming a precinct committeeman of a political party (and
thus subject to Corrupt Practices Act), and that contributions can be broken down to sums
less than $500 and not recorded on the statement filed. Communication to Y,- .c Lw,\
JouRNAL, November 12, 1946.
91. The provisions of the Black Bill which provided for registration of lobbyists before
administrative agencies with the FTC may have been left out of the instant Act bkcause the
Joint Committee was concerned with improvement of congressional prozedurcs Cnly. It
may have felt such a provision was beyond the pale of congressional reorganization. The
broad definition of "legislation" given by § 302 might make possible an intLrpretation in-
cluding such activities, but this construction would find little support in terms of congrcs-
sional intent.
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or qualitative suppression of political propaganda has never achieved success
in the United States.92 Furthermore, it runs counter to democratic theory,
made explicit in the First Amendment, that free discussion best promotes
the informed public opinion necessary to rational legislative decision. But
informed public opinion presupposes knowledge of all the facts, including
any personal interest and bias on the part of the speaker. The force of parti-
san propaganda can be effectively diminished by revelation of its source and
exposure to informed public criticism. This theory underlies lobby registra-
tion; the publicity principle 91 is embodied in the fact that all records are
open to public inspection.
The publicity given to pressure group activities by the Act is more illu-
sion than reality. Even if the loopholes in the registration provisions were
plugged by amendment and additional pertinent information required, it is
improbable that the Act would accomplish much toward mitigating the evils
presently existing. Operation of the publicity principle requires that actual
awareness of the extent of pressure group activities be known both to legis-
lators and the public. The Lobbying Act depends upon the fact that the
information is open to the public coupled with its publication in the Congres-
sional Record to counteract the publicity methods of groups which use every
possible communication outlet to propagate their viewpoints. Furthermore,
the most important information from the public's point of view, that re-
vealed by the group's financial statement, does not even get the limited cir-
culation of the Record.
Examination of operation of the publicity principle under the analagous
provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act,9 4 the Voorhis Act 96 and the Foreign
92. The provisions of the Corrupt Practices Acts, which limit campaign expenditures
and contributions to political committees, have been consistently evaded. See POLLOCx,
PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS (1926) c. 8; Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944 (1945)
39 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 899; Comment (1945) 44 Micu. L. Rrv. 294. The Senate and House
committees investigating operation of the Federal Act in 1944 came to the conclusion that
the imposition of ceilings on expenditures was not an effective regulation and that pub-
licity was the only workable solution. They reported, however, that the present publicity
Oirovisions were entirely inadequate. SEN. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 80-2;
H. R. REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1945) 12.
93. See Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of
Exposure (1943) 10 U. OF CH. L. REv. 107; Smith, Democratic Control of Propaganda
Through Registration and Disclosure I (1942) 6 PUBLIC OPINION QUAITEmIuy 27, id. 11 (1943)
7 id. 707.
94. 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U. S. C. § 241 and 18 U. S. C. § 208 (1940). The registration
provisions of the Lobbying Act are almost identical to those of the Corrupt Practices Act. In
both instances statements are filed with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the
Senate. In view of the conclusions of the Senate and House committees in 1944 that such
publicity is inadequate to inform the public of election practices, it would seem improbable
that it will prove sufficient in the case of lobbying.
95. 54 STAT. 1201, 18 U. S. C. § 14 (1940). The Act, requiring registration of subversive
organizations, was never complied with, but its full and complete registration provisions
might well serve as a model of the kind of information which could be required of lobbyists.
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Agents Registration Act 91 leaves no doubt that some positive steps to secure
circulation of the information revealed on registration statements and finan-
cial records is necessary if the Act is to accomplish its objectives. Although
registration of foreign agents was reasonably complete, no effort to turn the
"pitiless spotlight of publicity" upon their propaganda was made. Adminis-
tration by the State Department was so inept that it was transferred to a
special division of the Justice Department, where information submitted
was analyzed by experts and efficiently filed.97
Special committees of the House and Senate appointed to investigate
operation of the Corrupt Practices Act came to the conclusion that the
analogous publicity provisions of that Act had not yet been made effective.,
3
Specific criticisms included the lack of a single central office with power to
develop a uniform accounting system and render data intelligible to the
public, as well as the lack of concern of officials over failure to file the requi-
site forms. Both committees, however, felt that disclosure could be made an
operative regulatory device.
It is clear that neither the Clerk of the House nor the Senate Secretary
has the administrative organization to analyze relevant information sub-
mitted under the Lobbying Act, make pertinent extracts from it, and adopt
an efficient classification and indexing system. But efficient administration
would be merely a prerequisite to preparing the data revealed into concise
and comprehensible statements which would be made available to press and
radio services. If the public is to be informed of the facts disclosed by regis-
tration, those facts must get the widest possible circulation in a simplified
and intelligible form.
If registration is to become an effective device for revealing group pres-
sures, a special enforcement agency must be established to investigate the
accuracy of statements filed and the compliance of those to whom the law
applies. It must be staffed to analyze propaganda, assess its effects, accu-
rately summarize detailed financial statements, and make the information
thus compiled readily available to press and radio services. Standard ad-
ministrative procedure which combines civil and criminal sanctions should
be adopted to enforce registration. Enforcement of disclosure requirements
should depend in the first instance upon publicity; criminal sanctions should
be invoked only as a secondary sanction to enforce compliance of recalci-
trant registrants with the agency's regulations.
96. 52 STAT. 631 (1938) as amended by 56 STAT. 248 (1942), 22 U. S. C. § 611 (Supp.
1941-1943).
97. See Institute of Living Law, supra note 93, at 113 ct seq.; id., Administration of
Foreign-Agent Registration Act in 87 CoNG. REc. Apr. A4417 (1941). The State Depart-
ment prepared no list of registrants, no efficient indexing system. Registrations v.ere buried
in files and could not be readily inspected by interested parties. The publicity actually pre-
pared by the Department consisted of one press release stating that no stigma was attached
to registration.
98. See note 92 supra.
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Such an agency could best operate under the supervision of a permanent
joint congressional committee which would be charged with overseeing its
methods and determining its policy. Full time personnel should be entrusted
with carrying on the investigatory work required. Congressional committees
do not, in general, perform repetitive jobs efficiently, and it is unlikely that
exposure of pressure group activities would be sufficiently sensational to
overcome this handicap. Precedent for a committee in a supervisory ca-
pacity can be found in the Reorganization Act itself, which establishes con-
gressional oversight of the Legislative Reference Service, the Congressional
Record and the Office of Legislative Council.9
New techniques for molding public opinion are constantly evolving and
efficient administration of a registration act would require that statutory
authority given an enforcement agency be flexible enough to meet all such
developments. The act should, therefore, be broad enough to cover all or-
ganizations which mold political opinion in any way, and should give the
agency authority to exempt those which it found to be outside the pressure
group category, e.g., genuinely educational societies. A similar measure of
discretion should be given in the determination of the type of information
to be submitted.100
Instead of exempting, as does the present Act, all those subject to the
narrow provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, a comprehensive act would
include them within its provisions. The problem of regulating election pres-
sures is only part of the larger problem of regulating all political pressures
exercised by organized groups. Support of favorable candidates is just one
method used by special interests to influence legislation. If such activities
were brought within the publicity provisions of an effective lobbying statute
present inadequate legislation could be repealed.
OTHER PROVISIONS AFFECTING LOBBYING
Any legislative provision designed to improve the knowledge and efficiency
of legislators will diminish the likelihood of lobbying abuses. The effective-
ness of the professional lobbyist in securing legislation depends in large meas-
ure upon his technical knowledge of the complicated subjects of modern laws.
Legislators, incapable of personally investigating every governmental prob-
lem, have become dependent on these experts for information in the field of
their special interest; this information is, of course, often biased. Legislation
99. Sections 203, 204, 221. The Library of Congress has always operated under Con.
gressional supervision.
100. A similar conclusion was reached by the House Committee investigating campaign
expenditures in 1944 as to administration of the Corrupt Practices Act. See H. R. RE, r. No.
2093, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1945) 11-2. See also S. 990, 77th Cong., 1st Sess, (1941) (pro-
posing "Office of Minority Relations" to expose sources of poisonous propaganda), analyzed
by the Institute of Living Law, 87 CONG. REc. Alp. A1038 (1941).
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proposed and drafted by lobbyists has been accepted without proper evalua-
tion of its consequences.
The Reorganization Act has attempted to meet these problems by increas-
ing greatly appropriations to the Legislative Reference Service 101 and Office
of Legislative Counsel. 1 2 Employment of research experts to provide both
committees and individual members of Congress with unbiased information
on all subjects of proposed legislation will weaken the ability of pressure
groups to determine congressional policy. Similarly, increased personnel to
assist legislators in drafting legislative proposals will make congressmen less
eager to accept the services of legal counsel employed by special interests.
Presentation of factual data and digests of bills and hearings 103 to fit the
needs of Senators and Representatives should aid them in coming to a ra-
tional decision.
The prohibition of private legislation and the transfer of responsibility for
determination of governmental tort liability Ma" to the judiciary may also
serve to lessen the pressures of those seeking legislative favors. It is not im-
probable that these provisions aimed only indirectly at lobbying will be more
effective than the direct regulation imposed by the lobbying title of the Act.
CONCLUSION
It is probable that the Lobbying Act will prove largely ineffective. The
loopholes provided by the "principal" requirement, the incompleteness of
the information required to be filed, the lack of an adequate enforcement
agency, and the weakness of the publicity provisions may combine to make
the Act as dead a law as similar state statutes.
101. Section 203. The Legislative Reference Service is established as a separate depart-
ment of the Library of Congress and appropriations will be increased annually until 1949
when the sum of $750,000 will be provided. Specialists in certain fields such as agriculture,
education, labor, taxation and others are available for special work with committees. Some
of these specialists have already been appointed and include such recognized experts as
Francis Wlcox (State department consultant), Howard Piguet (Chief economist of Tariff
Commission), Gustaf Peck (Labor adviser to NRA, WMC, and VPB), T. A. Goldenweier
(Federal Reserve Board), Ray Manning (Taxation authority), George Galloway, Meyer
Jacobstein (Brookings Institute), Dorothy Shafter (educator), T. J. Kreps (Stanford pro-
fessor), and W. Brooke Graves. For the work of the Service prior to the instant Act, se
Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress pursuant to H. Con. Res.
18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 413 et seq. Similar work in state legislatures is discuszed by
'Witte, Technical Services for State Legislators (1938) 195 Tin A r mms 137.
102. Section 204 of the Reorganization Act increases appropriation to the Office to
,$250,000 by 1949 for bill drafting services. It is unlikely that this sum will be sufficient to
-atisfy the requirements of individual legislators, although it should be sufficient to draft
bills for committees. Other provisions which will help improve the knowledge and efficiency
.of Congress are discussed supra notes 3, 4, 5, 6.
103. Section 221. A congressional committee is charged with overseeing an improved
digest service in the Congressional Record designed to enable congressmen to evaluate more
easily legislation coming up for consideration.
104. See note 6 supra.
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Congress has recognized 'the need for regulating pressure group activities.
It has seen the solution not as prohibition of an undesirable practice but as
an adaptation of present imperfect mechanisms for expressing group opinion
into a political pattern which will utilize this opinion to improve the decision-
making process. It is to be hoped that this growing realization of the prob-
lem will lead Congress to amend the present Act to effectuate more nearly
the congressional purpose.
